Wills of Power

What was Rome’s Involvement in the Hellenistic Kings Last Testament

  Good Hellenistic Monarchs were cunning as wells as ruthless in the pursuit of power. Moreover this seems no different with their last testament. For the Hellenistic kings, wills could be used in the game of power to secure their life from assassination and ensure that a bitter enemy, usually a family member, was kept in place. Further, royal wills for the Hellenistic kings served as an extension of their diplomacy with Rome, which was becoming essential in the Mediterranean as Rome’s power and control increased. Many kings would include in their will a clause about bequeathing their kingdoms to Rome, or a successful succession of power for their children. While each royal will is unique there are some general themes within each. These overarching themes relate to how monarchs interpreted and needed a friendship with Rome and how the game of power, between the Hellenistic siblings, was played. In this essay I will argue that Rome’s involvement in Hellenistic Royal wills comes down to a pattern of the Monarch wanting to keep their own power and then ensure the succession of that power to their children.

  Hellenistic Monarchs saw being a friend and ally to Rome as a good policy. By being on the good side of the Romans, or at least showing your enemies that, you could try and use the chaos in the Roman Senate to your own advantage. Because of this most kings included Rome in their wills in some way. Furthermore, these wills were often highly public and known by everybody. This openness was used to the advantage of the Monarchs who could use their wills as a insurance policy against assassination from other members of the royal household who had leadership ambitions (Braund 1983 pp. 49-50; Erskine 2003 p. 18). However, things were not always clear cut and the business of a king could be haphazardness. The first king to use Rome as a threat of bequeathment was Ptolemy VIII Physcon (Hekster 2012 p. 7). Physcon was very public and clear about the reasons for his will. We know this because there is a copy of the will in SEG IX. 7 (Braund 1983 p. 17). One segment in particular, lines 6-11, refer to a plot by somebody to overthrow his kingdom while he is alive and in lines 19-20 there is a suggestion that his kingdom would be attacked upon his death. While lines 11-16 state that the purpose of the will is to advert this attack on his life (Braund 1983 pp. 18-19; Polybius XXXIV.14). The publicity of the will in the general population and the documental evidence of an assassination threat suggests that the will was a strategic move designed to send a message. Moreover, his testament was made at a strategic time around 155 BCE after an assassination attempt in around 156 BCE. Suggesting that this message was aimed at the would be king killers.  

  The Roman Senate was a confusing entity for the Hellenistic Kings. Because of the many competing interests of the senators Rome’s actions were not always coherent to what it did in the past. However, Hellenistic Monarchs still tried to manipulate the system like they would other powers. For example Physcon assassination attempt on his life did not stop him trying to manipulate the Romans. He used the attempted assassination to help bolster his claim for Cyprus in the Roman Senate in 154 BCE (Gruen 1986 p. 698). They agreed, and while it is not stated in the will this may be one reason why the Roman people were chosen to be included in his will and not some other Hellenistic Monarch. Perhaps, Physcon saw the Romans as a safer inheritor who was unlikely to kill him, and who he could use to his own advantage when it suited him. In hindsight Physcon will would usher in a change for Royal Monarchs who sort to gain the support of the Roman Senate by including Rome in their wills in some way. For instance despite no guarantee Rome would carry it out the Will, Hekster argues, Physcon realised how useful Rome could be. By publicising his will he successfully used the threat of Rome in internal politics. Although this was problematic because while Rome was powerful it was also unpredictable to the Hellenistic Monarchs. Part of this unpredictability resided in the competing forces in the Senate (Hekster 2012 p. 119). Later Hellenic kings, such as Ptolemy XII Auletes who will be discussed later, would often travel to Rome to seek Roman friendship with specific Roman elites. Yet, Rome always only seemed to act when the situation suited its own interests and for the Hellenistic this was impossible to predict. 

  The amphimetric strife between Ptolemy VIII Physcon and his brother Ptolemy VI 'philometer' was a good reason to include Rome in the will. Moreover, its seems Physcon’s use of the will was a complete facade and instead was aimed at getting Rome on his side and not his brothers (Gruen 1986 pp. 705-706). Physcon’s will dictated that if he was to die childless then the kingdom should be passed on to Rome. However, Physcon was around twenty when the will was publicized and had ample time to father children. He may have wanted it to seem to his brother that Rome was on his side. By being the first king to proclaim Rome as heir he sent a powerful message to his brother that Rome was on his side and to stay away (Gruen 1986 p. 707). This insurance policy, while hardly noticed in Rome was useful to the young kings plans and as we have seen with Cyprus proved to be very beneficial (Braund 1983 pp. 49-50). In this way Physcon, and as we will see later kings, were practicing a game of smoke and mirrors to make themselves seem more powerful than they really were. In Physcon case it did not work so well, he was captured by his brother only to be later freed without Rome even paying that much attention.

  Rome was already important factor in the foreign policy and personal propaganda of the Attalids of Pergamon. For the Attalids the relationship with Rome served to strengthen their own power. It is then perhaps no surprise that the first King to successfully bequeath his kingdom was an Attalid (Evens 2012 p. 47; Gruen 1986 p. 592). Attalus III, who was childless, annexed his kingdom upon his death in 133 BCE upon the instructions in his will (Kosmetatou 2007 p. 159). For the Romans it was quite unexpected, as up till this period they had really only acted in sorting out disputes (Braund 1983 p. 22; Gruen 1986 p. 592). Therefore it took several years for Rome to accept the terms of the will. 

  To understand the reasoning why Attalus bequeath his kingdom rather then giving it to another family member we must examine the close history these two countries shared, and the propaganda upon which the Attalids relied on for their power. Foreign policy was not a new concept to the Attalids. Its first leader Philetarios built a strong system of alliances with the surrounding city states. Indeed Polybius devoted some time in explaining that Eumenes and Attalus I may have inherited a small kingdom but a powerful one because it had respect and good agreements of many kingdoms (Polybius Histories 23.11.78). In this way, the power of the Attalids rested on diplomacy and not military power similar to other Hellenistic Kingdoms. Moreover, Rome became an important player in the affairs of Pergamon when King Attalus I helped the Romans in their war against Philip V in the First and Second Macedonian War (Austin 2006 pp. 198-203). The relationship that formed was beneficial to both parties. On one hand Rome needed a base of operations in the East while on the other Attalus I wanted to expand his power and territory, and saw Rome as a method for achieving that. However, while this notion of close friendship with Rome suggests one possible explanation for Attalus III will. It does not follow the pattern as suggested by the thesis of this essay. That power, protection and the successful succession of that power were a high priorities for Monarchs. Then it is perhaps more likely that Attalus III bequeathment was more the result of internal conflict then outside admiration.

  Attalus III was not a typical Hellenistic King. He seems to not have had much involvement in public life and no desire for warfare. Instead he seems to have spent most of his time studying biology and medicine and doing gardening (Braund 1983 p. 22; Errington 2011: Pergamon; SEG 28. 960; Evens 2012 p. 144). Grien suggests that this personality did not blind Attalus III to the limits of the game of power played by other kings. Instead Grien suggests that Attalus III saw what Rome was becoming and decided to act. He suggest that rather than seeing Rome as an executor of royal wills, Attalus saw Rome as a the next world conquer. This Grien suggests is reflected in Attalus will. The most notable part was a clause that called for each of Pergamon subjects be granted full Roman style citizenship thereby ensuring that each citizen remained free (Gruen 1986 p. 597). In contrast to Physon’s will aimed at a life insurance policy then any real care for the people he governed, Attalus III looks generous. However, Grien’s explanation may be better understood in hindsight. As it does not follow the pattern we see of Hellenistic Kings and their attitude towards wills of first the retention of power and then the successful succession of that power to the next generation. 

  Attalus III was not a popular king and his reign was troubled by uprisings. His reclusive lifestyle, in stark contrast to other Attalid Kings, caused the population to become dismayed. Rumors about the king killing people for experiments and wasting the wealth of the kingdom were widespread. And as a result the kingdom was plagued by civil unrest. Diodorus in particular notes that the subjects of Attalus did not like the king and often disagreed with him (Diodorus Bibliotheca 39. 60, 1-62). According to Vavřínek the freedoms granted in the will were not so much for the benefit of the people but to ensure that the will was carried out after his death (Vavřínek 1957 pp. 50-55). Part of this may have to do with Attalus III a step-brother Aristonicus, later called Eumenes III, who desired the throne. Aristonicus posed a serious threat to Attalus power (Kosmetatou 2007 pp. 163-164). Not only was the Kingdom unstable but it had another potential King who may have been better than the current one . 

  This amphimetric strife is not an unusual reason for a kingdom to be bequeath to Rome. As we have seen Ptolemy VIII Physcon and his brother Ptolemy VI 'philometer' employed Rome in several ways to try and overpower each other (Kosmetatou 2012 p.1 ). So it is not unusual for a Hellenistic King to be bitter towards any potential rival that was not his own choice. This explanation of rival siblings fits with the overall general theme of Hellenistic wills. However, unlike Physion who seems never really to have intended Rome to get his kingdom. Attalus III fails to have any real heirs other than his step-brother and dies before anything can be done about it. This may also explain why the will favours the people so much. Attalus may have designed it that way to ensure public support for the will (Vavřínek 1957 p. 50). This is easy to see when we consider the action of Aristonicus. While Rome was busy debating whether it should ratify the will, Aristonicus stepped in to fill the power vacuum. However, while he presented himself as a social revolutionary promising freedom to cities and the enslaved in to hope of gaining the support of the lower class’s he just came across as another dynastic contender (Evens 2012 p. 47; Gruen 1986 p. 597). Moreover, under the terms of Attalus will the people were already free with Roman protection. All they had to do was wait till it was ratified by the Roman Senate. 

  This came by 131 BCE when the Romans sent an army and crushed what little support Aristonicus had (Liviy, Periochae, 59). And thereby Rome carried out the terms of the will under the guidance Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who was a Roman politician pushed for Rome to annex Pergamon, but only when it suited the interest of the Romans. Aristonicus’s alliance with Gaius Blossius, an anti-Rome philosopher who helped in a popular uprising in Rome and brother of  Gracchus, may have put the Romans at uneasiness at it threatened their link to the East (Braund 1983 pp. 22-23; Evens 2012 p. 48; Strabo XIV.1.38; Gruen 1986 pp 599-600). This may be why Rome decided to act and ratify the will. Yet, as we shall see it is not unusual for Rome to act only when the situation suited their own interests.

  Succession is a problem for a monarchical system. And while the Hellenistic kingdoms practiced co-rule with the chosen heirs, this often did not work . Therefore, Rome’s power and role as a mediator between the various Mediterranean kings also served another use for monarchs, to use Rome to ensure that power was passed along safely to their children. By putting in their wills that the Kingdom would go to Rome unless there was children involved, the Hellenistic Monarchs may have been trying to ensure a peaceful succession (Braund 1983 p 28; Siani-Davies 1997 p. 321). Furthermore, the kings may have used this to ensure that their children already had a close association with Rome that could lead to a good friendship. This would have become more necessary as Roman control of the Mediterranean strengthened (Austin 2006 p. 430). Ptolemy XII Auletes last testament and life demonstrates this new reliance on Rome. While his will does not bequeath his kingdom to Rome it does set out a succession plan for his children. In the will Auletes states that upon his death his children are to be joint rulers with the protection of Rome (Braund 1983 p. 34 ). Perhaps with this clause Auletes was trying to ensure his own power and that of his children by befriending Rome. Unlike the other kings we have looked at, Ptolemy XII has no step-brothers or sisters who were challenging him for the throne, however, his greatest threat to power was Rome itself. 

  It is not surprising that during his lifetime Auletes took steps, such as pay 6000 and then 10,000 talents, to become a friend and ally of the Roman people (Hölbl 2001 p. 237). When we consider the circumstances of his rise to power. Part of the reason for the dependence on Rome was the will of his father Ptolemy I Alexander whose very short but chaotic rule left a will in which he bequeathed his kingdom to Rome unless he had a legitimate heir. Since Ptolemy XII was not a legitimate son and his rise to power was based on the support of the Alexandrines. A lot of the actions he took can be understood is cementing his leadership with the Romans while trying not to cause hostilities with the Alexandrines, which he failed to do. And if we also consider that around this time Rome took a real interest in the affairs of Egypt where as in the past it just has sporadic interest only when it needed too (Braund 1983 p. 28; Hekster 2012 p. 7). We can understand that Auletes was under considerable pressure in an uncertain environment that no other Hellenistic kings had found themselves. 

  This of course made establishing his power more difficult. In Rome, a copy of Ptolemy I Alexander will was debated in the Senate, who by now had annexed several kingdoms, to answer the Egyptian Question, basically what to do with Egypt (Cicero and Siani-Davies 2001 p. 1). The question of the Romans is understandable, Egypt was by now the only other real power on the Mediterranean. However, despite the Egyptian Question we know that Cicero supported Auletes restoration to the throne, despite Cicero’s feelings towards the King (Cicero and Siani-Davies 2001 pp. 1-3).  Perhaps to make his position stronger Auletes bribed Julius Caesar with 6000 talents for formal recognition of his throne and to be a friend and ally of Rome. Which of course Caesar did. This just shows that Rome while it acted as the judicial negotiator still always acted in its own self interest. Foolishly, many hellenistic kings believed the Romans to be just, but this as we have seen is not the case they were only just when the justice suited themselves. With all this effort it is no surprise that Auletes sort to extend the friendship, which he bought, to his children by including them in the will. Auletes’s reign then follow the clear pattern that we see for Kings when they write their wills. First the establishment of personal power and then the extension of that power their children. Therefor, Royal wills became a way for Kings to ensure the smooth transfer of power from one generation to the next with Rome's help. It allowed the Kings to maintain a stability that is inherently difficult in a system that comes unstable when its leader dies. Furthermore, it makes sense that kings who sort so hard  for Roman recognitions would try to extend that friendlessness they built with the romans to their children.

  Power and the maintenance of that power with each successful generation was the main purpose of Royal Hellenistic wills. As Rome became stronger it was essential to Monarchs to be acknowledged as a friend and ally.  Wills also allowed Hellenistic Monarchs to try and manipulate Rome with the aim of achieving safety for themselves against assassination cause by amphimatric strife. However, in most cases Rome only acted on Royal wills if there was something they could gain. Whether that meant taking twenty years to annex a bequeath kingdom or keeping a king on the throne because he was willing to pay. Rome acted in its own interests. This, though, did not stop the Hellenistic Monarchs from trying. For them including Rome in their wills was a strategy of power that became more essential to their own power as Rome became more powerful. 

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